A Study on the Motivation and Economic Consequences of Corporate Controlling Equity
Abstract
This study analyzes the motivations and economic consequences of corporate controlling equity behavior among Chinese listed companies, especially in the context of high-quality development goals. Through qualitative case analysis of firms such as Greenland Group, Alibaba, and Vanke, the research identifies three dominant motives: shell listing, strategic fit, and merger & acquisition (M&A) demands. Economic consequences include stakeholder conflicts, shareholder agency issues, and stock volatility. By adopting agency theory and stakeholder theory frameworks, this study recommends implementing equity checks and balances, aligning control with strategy, and ensuring long-term financial sustainability. The findings contribute to understanding how control dynamics shape corporate governance and financial performance in emerging markets.
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