Research on the Introduction of Digital Tax in China Based on Tax Competition

Fuhan Liu

doi:10.30560/rfm.v6n1p63

Fuhan Liu Anhui Institute of Economic and Social Development, Anhui University of Finance and Economics, China

DOI: https://doi.org/10.30560/rfm.v6n1p63

Keywords: tax competition, digital tax, digital economy, digital industry

Abstract

Distinguishing international tax competition from horizontal tax competition among domestic local governments, and analyzing economic development, local fiscal sustainability and digital economic industry development respectively. It is found that domestic local economic development and horizontal tax competition are conducted through top-by-top tax competition and bottom-by-bottom tax competition. Point to digital tax. Then, we discussed the necessity of levying digital tax in China from domestic and international perspectives, and judged the feasibility of levying digital tax and the setting of collection entities from the perspective of the government and the market. We believed that there was no strong need for levying digital tax for international entities for the time being, and it was necessary and initially feasible for domestic entities to levy digital tax, but long-term planning was needed. At the same time, it emphasizes the importance of the construction of supporting systems such as policy publicity, technology development, business environment, and international voice.

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