

The Local Election Amidst the Oligarchs: Case Study Jayapura Regency of Indonesia's Local Election in 2017

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Received: January 4, 2019; Accepted: March 5, 2019; Published: March 10, 2019

This research is funded by the funding scheme of the Diponegoro University (DIPA) in 2018.

Abstract

This article scrutinizes the phenomenon of Local Government Election (Local election) of a regency at the easternmost province in Indonesia, Jayapura Regency of Papua. During the election period, there was a great number of violations against election rules which were not only sporadic but also designed on a structured, systematic and massive scale – using the term of Indonesian Constitutional Courts. The violations were related to the role of the oligarchs who cooperatively worked hand in hand to win the political contestation. The activities of the oligarchs which involved clerical-technical issues are undoubtedly prohibited by the Law of Pilkada. The clerical-technical issues include unlawful activities such as replacing some officials of polling station a day before the election, manipulating the official report documents like voting and the calculation of the votes forms, certificates of results and holographic forms of the votes calculation details and records of the results of valid vote calculation at the polling stations in massive numbers. In the Jayapura Regency Election, it is found that the practice of the election administration regime is defied by an electoral shadow structure played by the Oligarchs. Thus, this article argues that the political decentralization results in a powerful control of the local oligarchs on the Local Elections which must be solved for the sake of Indonesia's democratization.

Keywords: the role of local oligarchs, electoral integrity, structured, systematic and massive violations

1. Introduction

In the year of 2017, Indonesia held the Local Elections (Pilkada) simultaneously in 101 autonomous regions, including 8 provinces, 76 regencies, and 18 cities. The Indonesian Election Authority stated that most of the regional elections had taken places in a democratic, safe and peaceful manner while there were some local elections stained by some political problems such as violations, fraud and physical conflicts among the supporters of each candidate. The 2017 local election is part of the democracy implementation in Indonesia which commenced to emerge after the fall of Soeharto's New Order.

1.1 The Practice of Local Elections in Indonesia

Since 2004, the mechanism of appointing the head of local governments in Indonesia was not performed by the local parliaments but directly by the people. Thus, the principle of One Person, One Vote and One Value (OPOVOV) has been implemented since that time. However, the mechanism of direct elections in Indonesia's regions raised a number of issues, especially outside the land of Java which mostly was facing social problems such as educational lags, economic gaps, and social group tensions. With those occurring problems, they were forced to practice the political liberalization, resulting in the practices of manipulative supports by the local political elites in the implementation of Local Elections. Instead of strengthening the process of institutionalization and the institutions in the regions, the local political elites demonstrated the practices of unhealthy politics. As time went by, the practices of political manipulations had decreased significantly at local elections in the following years. However, at some regions like the province of Papua, the easternmost province of Indonesia, those kinds of political manipulations still stained the practice of local elections in Indonesia.

1.2 Electoral Democracy Post-Soeharto

In 1998, after the reform had successfully deposed the power of Soeharto, Indonesia commenced feeling the spring of democracy. People's demands, especially of the university students, urged the constitutional reformation in

Indonesia, the autonomization of regions, the removal of the military in national and local politics and the eradication of corruption, collusion and nepotism. With the first general election held in 1999 after the fall of Soeharto, Indonesia commenced entering an aimless political liberalization. The subsequent elections were not more than the practices of procedural democracy to appoint the leaders. It can be said that Indonesia has not found the form of substantial democracy even after conducting the general elections four times after the fall of Soeharto.

1.3 The Election Day

One troublesome local election of those 101 simultaneous local elections in 2017 was the local election of Jayapura Regency. In this election, the involvements of external parties, especially from the structure of local government, were strongly indicated. Those involvements even touched the area of electoral processes. Although the case had been resolved by the national state institution which especially was assigned to resolve election issues, the case of Jayapura Regency local election had stained the history of the contemporary practice of general elections in Indonesia. The election day of Jayapura Regency was held on February 15, 2017. The election contested five pairs of candidates (Note 1), each of whom had divergent social, economic, educational and political backgrounds. The number of voters was 131.283 people, spread across 139 villages and 19 districts. At the election day, the voters were provided with 347 polling stations by the Jayapura Regency General Election Commission. In each district, there were five members of the District Election Committee (PPD). Thus, the total member of PPD is 475 people (5x95). In each village, there were three members of the Voting Committee (PPS). Thus, the total number of PPS is 1443 people (3x342). The law of Election in Indonesia required election supervision by the Election Supervisory Agency (Panwaslu). In the case of Jayapura Regency election, there were 3 people of Panwaslu at the regency level, 57 people at the district level (3x18) and 432 people at each polling station. (Note 2)

1.4 Malpractice in Local Election of Jayapura Regency

The local election of Jayapura regency staked the concept of integrity in the practice of general election. The electoral crisis in the local election had been indicated at the early stage. On the 29th of August 2017, the incumbent candidate replaced three officials in the regency government of Jayapura (Note 3), prohibited by the law of Pilkada in Indonesia. At the D-1, there was a turnover of 160 people of Voting Committee Group (KPPS) at 234 polling stations, which was not recognized by the local General Election Commission (KPU). (Note 4) After receiving a report from the candidate number 1, Panwaslu conducted an investigation whose result was recommended to the KPUD for the Re-voting in 17 of the 19 districts. At the judgment of Panwaslu, the voting and the counting on the 15th of February 2017 was invalid. (Note 5) The Panwaslu recommendation was opposed by the 19 district heads in Jayapura district and the Jayapura Regency KPU with the arguments that the Re-election (PSU) did not have a clear legal basis. The KPU further argued that this was an imaginary decision of Panwaslu. (Note 6) In the assembly of the Election Organizers Honor Council (DKPP), which was scheduled to examine alleged violations of the code of ethics, the ranks of the KPU and Panwaslu were found guilty. (Note 7)

1.5. Literature Review

The application of the integrity of elections is a necessity in the implementation of elections. The inevitability of the integrity of this Election in the context of achieving the election objectives such as to elect officeholders in the government, who will later determine the course of the state / regional government. The practice of elections that do not have integrity aside from not encouraging the adoption of internationally recognized democratic election standards with the honest and fair electoral principles, will delay and even fail to reach the goals of the election itself (Maisel & Buckley, 2005, pp. 56). It is an inevitable fact that not all elections meet expectations. Most elections that take place and end without integrity, are indicated with several indicators. Some of the most damaging indicators of Election integrity are the ballot boxes filled by those who are not officials, the election results figures manipulated either reduced or added, the involvement on the vote counts, election participants rejecting the results of the election process, and officials misusing the sources of state power (Norris, 2014, p. 3). Elections without integrity are also characterized by negative traits in elections, such as election malpractice, defective elections, manipulated contests, and election fraud. These negative signs should be countered by positive signs such as credible elections, acceptable elections, originality of election processes and results, and fair and honest elections (Norris, 2012, pp. 3-4). In all concepts of Election with integrity, the electoral process avoids the possibility of defective and failed elections, with clear standards and consistent benchmarks to assess the quality of each contestation. The quality of elections with integrity also refers to contestations that respect international standards and global norms that contain the regulation of elections leading to the implementation of appropriate elections (Norris, 2016, pp. 3-4).

The former Secretary General of the United Nations, who before his decease was active in chairing the Global Commission for Elections, Democracy, and Security, urged the importance of the role of civil society organizations

to monitor the performance of the government so that the elections were expected to meet the integrity of the Election. The stance of the government in elections must be with civil society organizations. Furthermore, the government should contribute to the development of electoral integrity, election funding, and protection of free media (Annan, et al., 2012, p. 8-9). Following the urgency of Global Commission under Annan, the International Institute of IDEA described how important regional organizations are in the effort to create elections with integrity. In addition to overseeing the electoral process damaging election integrity through election malpractice, it is recommended that elections must be held with true integrity (Cordenillo & Ellis, et al. p. 15).

The influences of the political environment in the relationship between the center (national government) and the regions (local government) on the local dynamics in Indonesia is also presented in this research. Since the fall of the Soeharto's New Order in 1998, the political constellation has continued to change. On one hand, the fall of the New Order became a landmark of the end of the New Order's autocratic, despotic and bureaucratic power (Winters, 2011, pp. 135-207). On the other side, the power structure in Indonesia transformed to be decentralized, democratic and pluralistic forms (Nordholt & Klinken, 2007, p. 20) in a political constellation known as the Reform Order. Habibie, who succeeded Soeharto, loosened repression in the context of relations between the center and the regions. This policy was taken by Habibie to answer the demand on the largest possible autonomy of most regions, as well as to dispel the demands of other regions that were strict in demanding an independence from Indonesia, while the remainder was due to proposals from a number of political elites at the national level suggesting the reformation of unitary state to become federal state (Lane, 2014, pp. 7-19).

How Habibie led the state after the fall of Soeharto exceeded the predictions and expectations of many. In the relations between the center and the region, Habibie transformed Indonesia, which was originally known as the most centralized country in the world, to become one of the most decentralized countries. The World Bank dubbed Habibie's radical policy as "the big bangs decentralization" (Shah & Thompson, 2004, p. 317). This epithet is meant to describe two things relating to the radicalism of decentralization policies. First, the radicalism of the increasing number of the local government administration in Indonesia, which before the implementation of the decentralization policy was originally merely 208 autonomous regions, consisting of 25 provinces, 151 regencies and 32 cities (Pratikno, 2008) later became 516 autonomous regions, consisting of 32 provinces, 388 regencies and 96 cities. After two decades of implementing decentralization policies, as of July 2018, the country of Indonesia has 542 autonomous regions, consisting of 34 provinces, 415 districts, and 98 cities (KEMENDAGRI, 2018). Secondly, along with the proliferation of autonomous regions, the transfer of funds from the center also increased to regions, increased from 2001 to 2006 by 30 percent through a number of general allocation fund schemes, special allocation funds, and revenue sharing funds (Fengler & Hofman, p. 245). In 2017, the fund transfer schemes from the center to the regions have become more significant. Those funding schemes included a general transfer fund of IDR 503.6 trillion, a special transfer fund of IDR 173.4 trillion, a regional incentive fund of IDR 7.5 trillion, moreover a village autonomy funding scheme of IDR 60 trillion. Decentralization in the form of government administration, which is supported by fiscal decentralization, in addition to supporting the capacity of the local economy, and coupled with political decentralization has succeeded in dynamizing the locals' life and local political constellation. (Note 8) Decentralization in the form of administration governance, which is supported by fiscal and political decentralization, besides supporting the capacity of the local economy has succeeded in dynamizing the social and political constellation in regions.

Concerns about the negative impacts on radical implementation of decentralization have emerged along with the introduction of these policies. These concerns are formulated as "the decentralization of grafting", with characteristics of (i) the absence of transparency and accountability in traditional local governance values; (ii) the safety of the people who assume that local politicians and administrators are generally more open to local needs and complaints, and are subsequently surprised by the contradicting reality; and (iii) the fragmentation of the state civil apparatus and the apparently uncontrolled authority of the gatekeepers of the services, that is, the head of regional government and the apparatus, due to the system of patronage (Hofman, et al, pp. 99-113). This concern was in fact proven because, in a number of regions, negative phenomena emerged due to the fragility of political institutionalization in the process of decentralization, such as the "congregational" corruption by the members of the West Sumatra Local House of Representatives (DPRD), and the following corruption case of the Governor of Aceh and the Chairman of the Banten Provincial DPRD (Crouch, 2010, pp. 223-229). It has been two decades since the implementation of decentralization. In only 2018, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) determined 108 people as suspects with various profiles of public figures such as legislative members, law enforcement officers, and regional heads. (Note 9) Other negative effects are the birth of political gangster phenomena (Wilson, 2010, pp. 199-216), "small kings" at the local level as political corruption combatants (Hofman et al, pp. 99-113), political champions (Romli, 2007), and bossism and local strongmen (Sidel, 2004, pp.

51-74). Another more dynamic aspect was the formation of the sultanistic oligarchs of Soeharto's autocratic heritage (Winters 2011, Winters 2012, p. 30), and those that exploited fragility or even caused the increasingly fragile political democratization at the local level (Hadiz & Robison, 2013, pp. 35-57). In the formation of this oligarchic power, the political phenomenon of Jayapura Regional Election is associated with the Resource Dependence Theory, with Emerson (1962, pp. 31-41) as its main proponent, which basically stated "the entanglement" of the election regime in the midst of oligarchic co-optation on the power structure.

2. Method

The focus of this study is to scrutinize the phenomenon of the Local Election (Pilkada) in Jayapura Regency which was located at Indonesia's easternmost province, Papua Province in 2017. This study aims to answer why many problems which were related to the aspect of election integrity in the Jayapura still exist in the Regency Election. To explore answers, the researcher uses a case study method, while the approach utilized in this research is a qualitative approach, an approach that emphasizes the procedure for collecting, organizing, understanding, analyzing, and presenting systematically. Hence, the results of the studies conducted can be expected to be more contextual and able to describe the conditions more intact and answer what actually happened (Yin, 2018), in the event of the 2017 Jayapura Regency election disintegrity.

In addition to relying on in-depth interviews with a number of informants which was considered as primary data sources, this research also utilized official documents, legal decisions, court decisions, Jayapura Regency General Election Commission (KPU) office, KPU of Papua Province, Supervisory Jayapura Regency Election (Panwaslu), Election Supervisory Body (Bawaslu) of Papua Province, and KPU at the central level and Bawaslu at the central level, as well as Decision of Election Organizers Honorary Board (DKPP) - Election ethics council whose duty and authority was to examine, hear, and decide cases based on the code of ethics for election organizers. Sources of data from mass media news, which are considered as secondary data, are also taken into consideration in this study. The research location, not only in Papua but also in the offices of the institutions mentioned above, as well as the central office in Jakarta.

3. Results and Discussion

3.1 Election Candidates

The Jayapura Regency Election in 2017 contested five pairs of Regent and Vice-Regent candidate pairs. (Note 10) The *first* candidate is Yanni, a Muslim woman who is also the Chairperson of the Papua Gerindra Party. The figure was described as a trusted person of Gerindra Party Chairman Prabowo Subianto in Papua. Prabowo is a presidential candidate who failed to win over President Joko Widodo in the 2014 elections and re-nominate himself in this 2019 election against President Joko Widodo. Yanni paired up with Zadra Afanya, a senior manager in the Sinar Mas Group business group owned by Chinese blood tycoon Eka Tjipta Widjaja. This pair is politically endorsed by the Gerindra Party. The party is in coalition with the National Awakening Party (PKB), a party made by tolerant Muslim leaders including the former Indonesian 4th President Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001). This candidate was also supported by the National Mandate Party (PAN), the party made by the main figure of the most important reform and the opponent of Soeharto's New Order, Prof. Amien Rais, a figure who once both promoted and impeached Abdurrahman Wahid from the presidency. This pair is carried by six seats in the Jayapura Regency DPRD.

The *second* pair of Regent and Vice-Regent candidate are Mathius Awoitauw and Giri Wijayantoro. Awoitauw is an incumbent of the regent leading Jayapura Regency from 2012 to 2016. He is also the brother of the Chairperson of the Jayapura Regency DPRD, Edison Awoitauw, who was later appointed by his younger brother as the head of the campaign team and experienced in holding elections for he had served as the Chairman of the local KPU for two periods. The incumbent stood with Giri Wijayantoro, described by the local media as an "active and successful figure in clearing forests in Development Region IV of Jayapura Regency, covering Yapsi, Kaureh, and Airu Districts Jayapura Regency, but backed by Jayapura Regional Police Chief, Regent Mathius Awoitauw, and Chairperson of the local DPRD also incumbent brother, Edison Awoitauw." (Note 11) The main supporters of this candidate pair are the NasDem Party, a party made by Surya Paloh who is the owner of the biggest news television channel in Indonesia, Metro-TV. The party was in coalition with the Hanura Party, a party made by the former ABRI Commander when Indonesia entered the transition of power from President Soeharto to President B.J. Habibie, namely General (ret.) Wiranto. Other coalition members are parties whose general chairperson is former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2009 and 2009-2015). The pair was supported by eleven local DPRD seats.

The *third* pair of Regent and Vice-Regent candidate are Godlief Ohee and Frans Gina. With the social background as indigenous rulers and social activists, the pair of candidates of Ohee and Gina nominated themselves as the

candidates with the full support of the indigenous people of Ondofolo leaders and Yeheskiel Wally living around Danau Sentani, Jayapura. This candidates pair promises to bring changes for the indigenous people in Jayapura Regency, especially for the improvement of the future of the (*beradat*) norm-based young generation. As the children of the land of Jayapura, in their point of view, the development of Jayapura has not yet touched indigenous peoples. If they succeed in winning the elections, they promise to raise the dignity of the indigenous people for a better life. Their candidacy in the Jayapura Regency Regional Election is performed through independent way (without the support of political parties).

The *fourth* pair of Regent and Vice-Regent candidate is Siska Yoku and Marselino Waromi. Like the previous candidate, these Papuan female leaders nominated themselves as individual (independent) candidates. Siska is the Chairperson of the local Indonesian Employers Association (Apindo). She has been active in the management of the Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKPI). As an alumnus of the Law Faculty of the Cendrawasih University in Jayapura decided to stand with Waromi, who had once established and even served as Chair of the Papua Regional Unity Party (PPD). Previously, she was a Deputy Chairperson of the Jayapura City Golkar Party DPD. But in the 2014 General Election, she became a legislative candidate for the Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKPI). As independent pairs of the candidate, their vision was to advance the Papua people, especially the people who live in Jayapura Regency.

The *fifth* pair of Regent and Vice-Regent candidate are Jansen Monim and Abdul Rahman Sulaiman. Monim managed to obtain a degree in engineering and completed a master degree in management at the Widya Jayakarta College of Economics, Jakarta. He is also a functionary of the Indonesian National Sports Committee (KONI) in Papua, precisely as the Regional Chairperson of the Indonesian Paddle Sports Association (PODSI) of Jayapura City. Monim once had a career in the Papua Province government bureaucracy, with the last position being the Head of the Public Works Office of the Papua Province. In this election, Monim stood with a local Muslim leader, who is also a member of the Jayapura Regency DPRD for the period of 2017-2022 from the Golkar Party faction, Abdul Rahman Sulaiman. As a Papuan Muslim leader, Sulaiman easily obtained a great number of supports with the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), so the pair of candidates pocketed 11 seats in the Jayapura Regency DPRD.

3.2 *The Crisis of the Jayapura Regency Regional Election*

3.2.1 Before the Election Day

According to the law of Pilkada, incumbents are prohibited to conduct a change of office personnel six months before the date of the candidate pair confirmation until the end of the term of office unless having obtained a written approval from the Minister of Home Affairs, and if the candidate proved to do so may be disqualified from the nomination and/or winning results. (Note 12) The incumbent of Jayapura Regent was sued by candidate pair number 5 Jansen Monim and Abdul Rahman Sulaiman because the action of changing regency high officials at the middle period of Pilkada was considered as a violation against the rules. (Note 13) The number 3 candidate pair Godliel Ohee and Frans Gina also filed a lawsuit to Bawaslu, with the same argument as the claim of the candidate pair number 5. (Note 14) The incumbent on August 29, 2016 replaced three high-ranking officials within the Jayapura Regency Government, namely (i) Head of the Department of Industry, Trade and Cooperatives (Perindagkop); (ii) Head of Industry in the Department of Industry and Trade; and (iii) Director of the Yowari Hospital in Jayapura Regency. The central Bawaslu, after receiving and reviewing reports from candidate number 5, states that what was done by incumbents was illegal, and further ordered the KPU of Papua Province through the central KPU to disqualify the nomination of the incumbent, Mathius Awoitauw.

One day before Election Day (pre-election), there was a change of officers at some of the Polling Station (TPS). This change is very ironic because it is not recognized by the local KPU ranks, as stated by the Chairperson of the local KPU in the DKPP session (Note 15). This recognition was denied by the Papua Provincial KPU in the trial. Members of the KPU Papua stated that there was actually a meeting of the Head of the KPU of Jayapura Regency with one of the candidates on February 18, 2017, and arranged for the replacement of KPPS officers. The Provincial KPU admitted, 160 Voting Committee Groups (KPPS) at 234 polling stations (TPS) in Jayapura District did not have the appointment decision letter during the implementation of the February 15, 2017, regional election. The Papua Provincial KPU considered that the implementation of the Jayapura regional election was not legitimate or illegal. In the direct sentence, "we got the candidate campaign number 1 report that out of 348 polling stations in Jayapura Regency, there were 234 polling stations for which KPPS and PPS were replaced without legal procedures" (Note 16). Pair candidate number 1 stated, from 348 polling stations spread across 19 districts in Jayapura Regency, the day before the Election Day, there were 1,002 officers at 240 polling stations who carried out the voting and counting process at 240 polling stations which were illegal (Note 17).

3.2.2 The Voting Day

At Hinekombe polling stations number 10, two voters had 129 Forms of the C6-KWK and shared with at least four other people. This form is a letter of invitation issued by the Voting Committee (PPS, in each village), as a requirement to attend and be able to use the right to vote. In order to hear the report, the Panwaslu immediately conducted an investigation and its results stated that they were eligible to be processed to court. (Note 18) The panel of judges of the Jayapura District Court in the trial on March 15, 2017, sentenced two defendants for an imprisonment of 1 year 3 months and a fine of 14 million IDR. The defendants were proven legally and convincingly to have misused the invitation letter. (Note 19)

The results of the election on February 15, 2016, showed that candidate number 1 obtained 17,177 votes, number 2 obtained 42,286 votes, number 3 earned 5,190 votes; number 4 gets 775 votes; and number 5 gets 15,752 votes (Note 20). But the results of the vote count provoked the other four candidates to protest. On February 23, 2017, the four candidates raised objections. Along with their protests, Panwaslu recommended the PSU. Finally, the recapitulation was stopped for several weeks.

The recapitulation process on February 24, 2017, was chaotic, due to the replacement of the KPPS officers one day before the voting. The protests from the four candidates were also due to unavailability of the forms of C-KWK Model, C1-KWK Model, and the Attachment C1-KWK Hologram Model, but those of photocopies at all 348 polling stations. (Note 21) The three types of forms should be fully held and filled by KPPS and the witnesses of the candidate pairs at the polling station. But, at the later days, the legal team of the candidate number 1 was reported that they were in the local KPU Office. A few days later, the suspecting activity was also reported to the local Panwaslu. With the video evidence included, the legal team of the local KPU secretariat was seen to fill in the Forms of the C-KWK Model, C1-KWK Model, and Attachment of the holographic C1-KWK Model, (Note 22) while also stating the filling of the three types of forms was massive. This is proved by a signature and a fraudulent signature of the KPPS and candidate witnesses in the Form Model C-KWK document, the ordinary C1-KWK model which is not holographic and attached to the witness Paslon after the vote count at the polling station. (Note 23) This is not only an extraordinary crime that violates the law and injures democracy but also affects the results of the vote counting to be legally flawed and unguaranteed. (Note 24)

In the Plenary Meeting of the District Level Vote Recapitulation on February 24, 2017, Panwaslu recommended the need for a re-Voting Day (*Pemungutan Suara Ulang* – PSU) in 236 out of 248 polling stations in 17 districts, (Note 25) arguing that KPPS officers were not listed in the appointment decrees, but they are totally new names. (Note 26) The PSU is a re-election mechanism at the polling station if the voting and counting process in a polling station is found when it is proved that there are irregularities, frauds or riots. DKPP in its decision strengthened the recommendations of the Election Supervisory Committee and ordered the Provincial KPU to take over the process of the ongoing stage, (Note 27) moreover since the Supervisory Committee's recommendation to conduct the PSU made the Election phase continue. However, the recommendations of the Panwaslu above were initially opposed by the Jayapura Regency KPU while stating that the Panwaslu's PSU recommendations were unfounded and were merely imaginary forms because they were baseless. (Note 28) The opposition to the PSU was also indicated by the district heads. The District Heads of 19 different districts held a meeting in the Deputy Regent of Jayapura Regency Meeting Room on March 3, 2017, to draft a letter which essentially rejected the implementation of the PSU recommendations submitted by Panwaslu. The letter was given a header with the term of "Association of District Heads" - organizations judged not having a legal basis for its formation - signed by the 19 District Heads in Jayapura Regency and who were given Number 06 / AKD-III / 2017 March 3, 2017 concerning The Stance Statement on the recommendation of the District Head Association. (Note 29)

The letter from the District Heads was addressed to the Chairperson of the Indonesian DKPP in Jakarta, containing: (i) the polemic that developed after the Pilkada was deliberately carried out by the two election management institutions; (ii) explicitly reject the PSU in 236 districts in 17 districts that are not based on the rules and results of a thorough study and supporting factual data; (iii) If point 2 above is forced to be implemented, as a political coach at the district level we are not responsible for horizontal conflicts that will occur; and (iv) The implementation of PSU without a clear legal basis is a form of professionalism and accountability of the organizers. (Note 30) The action taken by the 19 district head above was investigated by Panwaslu and Sentra Gakkumdu. After conducting a series of hearings, in the reading of the verdict, the Panel of Judges of the Jayapura District Court convicted the 19 district heads in Jayapura Regency. They are judged to be legally and convincingly proven to have committed criminal offenses as stipulated in the provisions of Article 188 of Act Number 1 of 2015. The Judges sentenced them with a one-month prison and a fine of Rp600 thousand and 15 (fifteen) months subsidies. (Note 31)

In the consideration of the Assembly's decision, they judged that (i) The defendants as district heads are regional officials or ASN officials who are prohibited from involving themselves or being involved in the political process,

especially the Jayapura Regency Regional Election in 2017, as stated in the provisions of Article 71 paragraph (1) Law Number 10 of 2016; (ii) Defendant's actions were beneficial for the candidate of the regent and deputy regent number 2 Mathius Awoitauw and Giri Wijayantoro, because the Defendants knew that from the vote count results on February 15, 2017, at 346 polling stations and on vote counting at the 19 district level candidate pair number 2 has the most votes from the other 4 Candidates, so the defendants reject the PSU with the intention of continuing the stages of recapitulation of the vote counts that already existed at the Regency KPU level, and this situation will make candidate number 2 win or, in other words, be re-elected as a regent and deputy regent of Jayapura Regency; (iii) By rejecting or opposing the recommendations of the Jayapura Regency Election Supervisory Committee, the defendants have not yet or did not obtain the certainty of vote acquisition as a result of administrative violations as the Panwaslu recommendation letter Number 094/Panwas.Kab.JJP/II/2017 dated February 23, 2017; (iv) The Panel of Judges also assessed that the defendants as district heads or regional officials or ASN officials had clearly made their alignments, when they and their wives took pictures together with Paslon number 2 using blue uniforms and brandished 2 (two) fingers as a symbol of Paslon Mathius Awoitauw and Giri Wijayantoro. Therefore, according to the Assembly, the defendants made decisions and/or actions that were beneficial and/or detrimental to pairs of the candidate. (Note 32)

On July 28, 2017, the regent candidate number 1 Yanni reported the Chairperson and members of the KPU of Papua Province with report No. 29/LP/PGBW/VII/2017, which basically stated that the problem after the KPU Papua only stipulated 229 polling stations of 348 polling stations in 19 districts resulting in 119 polling stations, not in the PSU considered invalid (Note 33). After conducting an in-depth study, Bawaslu through letter Number 0604/ K.Bawaslu/PM.06.00/VIII/2017, recommended to the national KPU and KPU Papua to (i) conduct an examination of 40 polling stations in 2 districts, namely Namblong and Kaureh, if there were differences in names - names that sign on the C1-KWK Model Form with the names listed in the KPPS Decree, then the PSU is carried out together with 229 predetermined polling stations; and (ii) Ensure that there is no change in the acquisition of votes at 79 polling stations outside the polling stations conducted by the PSU and polling stations conducted by scrutiny. (Note 34)

On August 16, 2017, candidate number 1 Yanni reported the Chairperson and members of the Bawaslu Papua to the Republic of Indonesia Bawaslu through a report Number 22/LP/PGBW/VIII/2017 dated August 16, 2017, which basically stated the contents of the report regarding the notification of the status of the report issued by the Papua Election Supervisory Body on the report Number 21/LP/PGBW/VIII/2017 with a review of the findings of the Jayapura Panwaslu Number 005/TM/Pilbup-Kab. Jpr/II/2017. Again, Bawaslu on August 21, 2017, issued a Recommendation Number 0648/K.Bawaslu/PM.06.00/VIII/2017, in essence, the need to examine 39 Forms of Model C-1 KWK which was signed by people not listed in the photocopy of the KPPS Decree. Finally, the day after, Bawaslu issued a letter Number 0651/K.Bawaslu/PM.06.00/VIII/2017 containing directions to the Bawaslu Papua to resolve the disputed issue.

3.2.3 Election Settlement

The crisis of Jayapura Regency Election in 2017 ended after the Constitutional Court (MK) decided to reject the dispute over the election results submitted by Paslon number 3. The MK argued that all the riots had been resolved when the KPU followed up the DKPP Decision to conduct the PSU, while the vote after The result of the PSU was obtained: number 1 candidates were 9,255 votes, number 2 was 34,630, number 3 was 2,078 votes, number 4 was 686 votes, and number 5 was 11,582 with a total of 58,231 votes (Note 35). Thus, from the results of the vote acquisition of the PSU on August 23, 2017 exceeded the 2 percent threshold as the minimum requirements for vote difference determined by the election law, so the Constitutional Court refused (dismissal) the candidate number 5 request on the grounds that the applicant had no legal standing (Note 36). According to the Indonesian constitution, the Constitutional Court's decision is final and binding.

3.3 Local Election: The Test of Integrity

The Jayapura Regency Regional Election in 2017 stakes the integrity of the elections in Indonesia. The objectives of Pilkada are indeed achieved such as the appointment of regional heads and deputy heads of the local regions, who are now inaugurated and run the wheels of local government. However, at the pursuit of the objectives of the elections, it is run in inelegant ways. The word of "inelegant" manifests through a proliferation of objections, frauds, and irregularities in the elections. The holding of elections that do not have integrity, in the case of the Jayapura Regional Head Election, does not encourage the validity and fairness of the principles of the General Election. The election process does not show credibility, because besides full of the obvious violations, the involvement of outside parties the election organizers stained the integrity as well. These outside parties should be prohibited from being involved in elections.

3.3.1 Integrity at Election Stages

In general, the stages of the election consist of voter registration and updating the voter list, nomination, election campaigns, voting and counting, and determination of election results. At *the first three stages*, there is no fraud reported and it was handled by election stakeholders. However, the stages of voting and counting, which are at the main core of the General Election, indeed have a lot of election malpractice. *First*, the abuse of the invitation letter. On Election Day, there is a distribution of notification letters or invitation letters to names that do not have rights to receive them. The number of invitation letters held, not in a small number, is as many as 129 pieces. This number shows half more than the number of voters in a polling station. If the perpetrators are not quickly arrested and then not processed by local election supervisors, the malpractice of this election will definitely undermine the integrity of the voting and counting process. Fortunately, Election Supervisors move quickly and process it as a matter of election crime. In the rules of elections in Indonesia, the provision applies that the misuse of invitation letters, which should fall into the name of the voters, is a criminal act in the election.

Secondly, the replacement of KPPS officers a day before the General Election Day. The results of the Panwaslu investigation stated that 1,002 of the 3,132 KPPS members in 240 polling stations and spread across 19 districts throughout the electoral district in the Jayapura regional election were not the official names appointed by the Jayapura Regency KPU. It is very ironic if the head of the local KPU, as the main person in charge of the elections, does not know the replacement of his subordinates. In the DKPP assembly, the Head of the Jayapura Regency KPU stated that there were indeed several names replaced due to illness and other reasons, but it did not change the names of the new KPPS. They further stated that they did not know about the change. Thus, it becomes an intriguing question, how could the local KPU not know the change, while the replacement of KPPS members in large numbers. Then who does the change, and for what motive or purpose is the change? Things that cannot be done by merely anyone, if the change is true and of course whoever makes the change is those who have a power that cannot be matched by the local KPU. The researcher believes that those who make changes are not just anyone, and who are certain that the perpetrators are those who have very strong access to power.

Thirdly, on the D-day of Election, KPPS in 240 out of 324 polling stations do not hold the original forms of three types, but they only hold blank photocopies, all of which contain vital documents in the process of voting and counting, namely a form for recording minutes of collection and counting, votes at polling stations, certificate of results and details of vote counting at polling stations, and attachments to the notes on the results of legal holographic votes. According to the provisions, the three forms are held, filled, and accounted for by the KPPS as well as signed by the witnesses participating candidates in the elections. The three forms are the measurement of the integrity of the elections. If all of three forms do not exist or only slightly get damaged, furthermore if they are held by parties outside the KPPS, then the credibility of the voting and counting process in the polling station is no longer accountable. If the process at the polling station can no longer be accounted for, then it influences the recapitulation processes at the next stages. This is tantamount to the damage of the integrity of the election administration. Later it was revealed that the three blanks were in the local KPU Secretariat, and were filled by some staffs by transferring the results of filling out photocopies to three types of original blanks.

3.3.2 The integrity of the Election Organizer

In the tradition of elections in Indonesia, the organizers of the General Election consist of the ranks of the Election Commission (KPU) and the Election Supervisors (Bawaslu). Performing their tasks, they are bound by the code of ethics of the election organizers. If there is evidence of partiality, they can be examined in the sessions of the Election Organizers Honor Council (DKPP). In this Jayapura Regency Election, the organizers of the General Election were not only involved in the conflict but also showed partiality to the participants of the Election. The KPU at regency level rejected the Panwaslu recommendation regarding the PSU, while in the Panwaslu body of Jayapura Regency consisting of three people, with a conflict map that the chairman was suspected of siding with candidate number 1 and the other two members sided with candidate number 2, as well as two members of the local KPU including the chairman leaning towards candidate number 1, while only one person who is neutral and impartial, while three other members tend to side with candidate number 2 (Note 37). In the hearing on June 8, 2017, DKPP imposes a temporary termination of sanctions to the Chairperson and KPU members, also to the Chairperson and Panwaslu members. In addition, the DKPP also imposed sanctions on no less than 25 election organizers including dismissing 15 Chairpersons/members of the Election organizers in Jayapura Regency. (Note 38)

3.4 Local Election in the Landscape of Political Decentralization

The fall of the New Order in 1998 was immediately followed by political liberalization in Indonesia. The relationship between the center and the regions on the authority delegation was immediately affected by

liberalization in the regions. In the general sense, decentralization is defined as the regional liberalization. The strengthening regional dynamics is also supported by the transfer of material resources from Jakarta to regions in the form of money, people and goods. With decentralization and facilitated by fiscal policy, local actors are more comfortable to make the regions as an arena for political fights. With decentralization policy that including the form of administrative power of government, it encourages political actors in the regions to seize political value in the form of the implementation of regional elections.

On the other hand, after the fall of Soeharto's New Order state, political actors who were under Soeharto's control spread to a number of political positions, and some of them survived at Golkar and transformed Golkar into a "new Golkar Party." Some established new political parties, but not a few also joined the new party made by a number of former military elites, former bureaucrats, or businessmen, and some of them joined PDI-Perjuangan led by Megawati Soekarnoputri. At the context of political diffusion, they spread to the regions to nominate themselves as members of the Regional Representative Council (DPD) representing the area from which the actors were born and were active in the New Order period. This DPD is a state high institution, which in each province is represented by four members of the election results. It is not a few of them to spread to their home to run for regional elections (governors, regents, and mayors).

In the first decade after the fall of the New Order, the local political actors who were most prepared to face political decentralization were the bureaucrats who had previously, since the New Order era, mastered the local power structure which had become involved in the candidacy of the regional elections. Local entrepreneurs who were initially allergic to political life, because during the New Order period they were only used as "cash cows" by the New Order authorities who allied themselves with the military, later gained the opportunity to be involved in political activities and some of them registered or invited by local politicians and involved in political games in the elections. Local entrepreneurs have mastery of extractive resources at the local level, and such figures are most prepared with material to become rulers at the local level. It was seen in the decade of the early 2000s, at the local level, especially by taking the opportunity to become regional heads (governors, regents, and mayors), many regional heads with backgrounds from the senior bureaucrats of the New Order, with local entrepreneurs and/or opposition activists from the New Order. In the second decade after the 2010 reforms, a number of young generations who had held election management positions such as the KPU and/or Panwaslu, also eventually became candidates in the regional elections.

The phenomenon that could be observed at the beginning of the introduction of decentralization policy was that political dynamics at the local level were not sufficient to be politically institutionalized. At the formal level, the delegation of authority as a consequence of the implementation of decentralization of government administration, which was immediately followed by material transfers with various schemes and are also part of the implementation of fiscal decentralization, encouraged regional level political actors to fight for positions of regional heads and deputy's heads area. In the first half of the decade of the 2000s, in line with the implementation of political decentralization in the form of regional head elections (Pilkada), political actors were encouraged to compete in the regional election contestation. The effect that later raised is that the regions become attractive political playing fields, in other words, the provinces, districts, and cities are dynamic political playing fields. The tug-of-war between political powers, sometimes colored by bringing issues of local sons, tribes, religions, races, and between groups.

3.5 Structured Co-optation and the Role of Oligarchs

Starting from the description above, what happened in the Pilkada in Jayapura Regency showed the role of the oligarchs' power and the role of the subordinate powers of the Election regime. In this case, the Election regime, which was formatted institutionally according to the Indonesian constitution, proved to be powerless in the front of the actions of the local oligarchs. The Election Regime that works with the influence of the local oligarchic regime in such a way creates such acute dependence sacrificing the integrity of the election organizers. In the case of Pilkada, it appears that the organization managed by the Election regime works with a high dependence on local oligarchic games with material motives. Social interactions between organizations produce mutually beneficial values. Parties depend on each other, while both benefit from the value of mutually beneficial material. In the case of the Jayapura Regency Election, the political actors in the Jayapura Regency during the Pilkada had a strong structure which was able to co-opt other forces, including within the ranks of government organizers and even the election administrators. The most powerful actors are the one controlling the structural power of government like the ranks of the State Civil Apparatus (ASN) including their officials. If this thesis is related to the actions of 19 district heads in Jayapura Regency during the Pilkada, as the Jayapura District Court verdict convicted of actions beneficial to candidate number 2, then the theory of resource dependence is relevant to explain the problems of Jayapura Regency Election.

On the other hand, political co-optation can take an involvement in the structural power of the Jayapura Regency Election. As known, the most important and strongest political actors in each region, especially with the absence of function of public control, the state-based political actor is the only one that is most powerful in a region. The role of the most powerful political actor can be played by the head of the region. Then, how to explain the turnover of 1,002 KPPS a day before the Jayapura Regency Election Day? The new KPPS can only be appointed through the involvement of lower-level officials, or under the district, namely the subdistrict level. With regard to the explanation above, the role of regional heads and deputy regional heads, especially those who are running for office, have a very strong position. In other cases, other stakeholders also have an important role, but in areas with no adequate control functions, political actors sometimes instead play a balance function, but in many cases, it is actually part of the actor who is directly co-opted by the oligarchs both in direct and indirect ways. In the case of this regional election, the oligarchs were played by state and non-state-based actors with political resources and finally found their playing arena in this election. With a network of wealth, family, or connections with key holders within the local political structure, they urged officials and organizers of the local elections to win their political candidacy. In this case, the reason why the Pilkada in Jayapura full of chaos is due to the actions of oligarchs who play electoral democracy.

Borrowing a term from Winters, who developed the concept of oligarchy more extensively, what happened in the Jayapura Regional Election was "the power of few people to control many people," but became the material basis and their efforts to continue to control all games and rules through the control of material resources, resulting in inequality in accessing material resources. Thus, it is tantamount to giving births to inequality in the context of accessing political resources. This happened because the limited access to economic resources by most people in the regions resulted in limited access to decision-making in Indonesia. In the case of the Jayapura Regional Election, which is the proxy of the latest Indonesian electoral democracy, new oligarchs have emerged, accompanied by democratization as a negative symptom. Weak political actors with limited resources of power structures have succeeded in being co-opted by oligarchs holding political monopoly rights due to economic motives. One of the most observable political phenomena in Indonesia lately is that actors at the top of power must adjust to the new democratic game. They not only do it easily but also dominate electoral democracy.

Starting from the description above, the Election regime is unable to deal with the onslaught of the structure of co-optative power and oligarchs in Jayapura Regency. The second influence above dictates the power next to it, namely the Election regime, which although designed independently in a vertical structure, but in fact is unstoppable by the co-optation of the power structure and fraudulent practices of oligarchs. In other words, the dependence of the Election regime on local co-optation and oligarch regimes turned out to be stronger and even broke down the independence of Election organizers. Following the theory of resource dependence, the reliance on A (the local co-optation and oligarchs authority regime) played by B (the local election regime), has succeeded in taking in the example of Jayapura District Election disintegration. Dependency B is balanced with interests B placed above goal A indirectly and vice versa balanced with the usefulness of these objectives on B outside of relationality between A and B. The case of disintegration in the Jayapura Election can be read as a major part of the destruction of democracy in the local level.

3.6 National Political Constellation Perspective

Compared to the regime of Soeharto's New Order, the relations between local and national government is much more advanced due to more democratic approaches of the national government. The policy of contemporary political decentralization has stimulated the political participation which deemed a must in growing democratic and developing countries like Indonesia. The development is also encouraged by the systemic change on the people's representation and region's representation, another implication of Indonesia's constitutional amendment in Indonesia's reform era (2006, pp. 123). The amendment successfully eliminated the New Order's centripetal pattern which became the root of the political strain between Jakarta and the regions. The strain is because of the repression of national government towards the regions along the period of New Order which is also worsened with the corrupted behavior of the Jakarta. The vanished strain between the national and local government, however, led to the radicalization of the decentralization since some parties understand that the fall of New Orders would leave the local political acquisition to no one. Within the year of 1997 to 2001, there was a huge various social movement against the rulers of New Orders, as shown by the increasing offensive of Free Papua Movement (OPM).

With regard to counter all political pressures, the national government transformed the relations between center and regions, which was originally in the pattern of centripetal since New Order, to be centrifugal in the era of Reform (Freedman, 2006, pp. 125). With a centrifugal pattern of policy, the national government transferred the concentration of political power, which was all in the center, to regions. With this pattern, the center allocated a huge portion of power to regions so that the understanding, attention, and resolution towards local problems should

not be done by the national government but by the local government. The effect of this transformation is the strengthening of local capacity diffusions spread throughout all autonomous regions in Indonesia. With this paradigm, the establishment of a strong central government is only possible if the autonomous regions are able to maximally utilize the local resources. This phenomenon is fathomed as the political decentralization in the form of local autonomy which was introduced and applied in more comprehensive manners in contemporary Indonesia politics.

Along the implementation of the local election, the dynamics of local politics have been running up and down constantly. Mostly, the implementation of the local election has gone excellent, fair, peaceful and democratic – a sign of democracy maturity of its people. However, there is still some regions' election conducted and finished in negative ways such as the rise of horizontal conflicts, social clash or social furry which might lead to involving the local oligarchs' power causing numbers of deaths. The rise of those negative political traits, in spite of being a consequence of the political participation significant increase, is also part of the consequence of the power distribution between state-society relations because of the political reform. When the state-based political power (governing-elite) and the non-state power (non-governing elite) or other pressure groups were faced to run for local political power with different intentions to win the local election, then horizontal social frictions are inevitable. Thus, those negative political traits are, besides a part of the consequences of the implementation of political decentralization, caused by the shift of interaction pattern between state and society in the contemporary state structural power post-New Order.

The phenomenon of local election as explained above are part of the political excesses of the political shift from centered-government to decentralized-government which has not yet reached political maturity. The phenomenon is merely the manifestation of the explosion of political participation which was deemed natural in a country which is still in the process of democratic transition. Conceptually, in the life of democracy, it is possible for the public to have control, to solidify public opinion and to mobilize the mass power with only one intention which is to influence the process of decision making by the elites. In the case of Papua, the easternmost province of Indonesia which was treated unfairly by the central government, the democracy institutionalization only creates a conducive political atmosphere for segmented and particular political groups. However, it has not yet strengthened a proper political institutionalization and resulted in established political structures and institutions, which potentially unable the political groups to pursue their aspirations, innovations, and interest in a proper way. Furthermore, in the case of the 2017 Jayapura Local Election, the construction of democratic institutions has not yet strengthened the role of critical groups which should be balancers of state power.

4. Conclusion

The explanation of the Jayapura Regency Election in 2017 is the imagery description of the official electoral structure run by the election administration regime, alongside the operation of the shadow structure run by the local oligarchy regime. Even though the election administration regime was designed with independent structures, regulated by work functions in the law, and provided with a code of ethics, it was mercilessly attacked by the actions of the oligarchy regime as seen in the case of Jayapura Regency Election. In organizing elections, the first regime was mocked by the second regime, through a number of steps, which in principle succeeded in undermining the principles of integrity of the election, through the replacement of most polling stations in all districts, manipulation of voting and counting documents at polling stations, opposition by district heads to PSU recommendations, and other previous efforts such as the involvement of a number of officials. This assumption justifies the old thesis that developed in Election organizers, who stated that the integrity of the election administration, which consists of the integrity of the stages and the integrity of the election results is largely determined by the integrity of the election organizers.

In the perspective of the interests of the oligarchs, regional posture is an area that belongs only to the oligarchs, as a result of the policy of political decentralization since the beginning of the fall of the New Order state, while the character of oligarchs at the local level is actually a group well-established arena for local games, even though in fact it is not the true oligarchs, which in many European countries are in close proximity to the controls of the middle class and civil society. In the perspective of the interests of electoral democracy, as far as it appears in the Jayapura Regency Election, it is only a chain of long chains of mastery of extractive resources and political resources. Nevertheless, this Pilkada can be ended by the involvement of state institutions such as the Constitutional Court and the Honorary Council of Election Organizers, which carry out according to their duties, authorities, and obligations. Through their decisions, they succeeded in ending the crisis of the Jayapura Regency Election. Furthermore, the political liberalization, especially in the case of Jayapura Regency election in 2017, indicates that the political constellation after the fall of the New Order was inevitably dominated by local oligarchs. However, other political institutions such as Non-Governmental Organizations still were deemed insufficient to

challenge the power of local oligarchs. In other words, the phenomenon of Jayapura local election is a manifestation of the failure of electoral democracy. •

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Notes

Note 1. The Decision of KPU Jayapura Regency number 74/Kpts/KPU-Kab.Jpr/030.434090/2016

Note 2. The decision of KPU Jayapura Regency number 324/KPU/VI/2016

Note 3. Court Decision of State's Court Jayapura number 34/G/2017/PTUN.JPR February 8, 2018

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Note 5. Recommendation of Election Supervisory Committee (Panwaslu) of Jayapura's regency number 094/Panwas.Kab.JYP/II/2017

Note 6. The decision of the Court Number 1-A Jayapura:101/Pid. Sus/2017/PN-Jap

Note 7. The Decision of DKPP Number 46 and 88/DKPP-PKE-VI/2017

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Note 11. "Jayapura Blog Cyber Network – Blog Berita Asli Tanpa Rekayasa"—<https://jayapurablog.wordpress.com/2016/07/09/mathius-awoitauw-gandeng-mafia-kayu-jadi-calon-wakil-bupati-jayapura/> | Accessed: November 12, 2018

Note 12. Law number 10/ 2016, KPU's regulation Num 9/2016, Home Minister Regulation 73/ 2016

Note 13. Court's Decision Number 34/G/201/2017/PTUN.JPR

Note 14. Bawaslu's Decision Number 0835/K.Bawaslu/PM.06.00/IX/2017

Note 15. The Decision of DKPP's Number 46/DKPP-PKE-VI/2017 and Nomor 88/DKPP-PKE-VI/2017

Note 16. Interview with members of KPU of Papua's province Izak RK Hikayobi, 12 November 2018

Note 17. Interview with the lawyer of candidate number 1, Muchlish Betaubun, 14 October 2018

Note 18. Interview with Panwaslu's member, 15 November 2018

Note 19. Court Decision number IA Jayapura Nomor 101/Pid. Sus/2017/PN-Jap

Note 20. Complain to DKPP Number 85/VI- P/L-DKPP/2017 ke DKPP

Note 21. Document of complaint from candidate number 1 ke DKPP tanggal 17 Mei 2017

Note 22. Document of complaint from the lawyer of the candidate number 1

Note 23. Interview with a member of campaigning team candidate number 1, Muchlis Betaubun, 14 October 2018

Note 24. Interview with the chairman of KPU of Papua's province, Adam Arisoi, 15 November 2018

Note 25. Recommendation of Election Supervisory Committee (Panwaslu) of Jayapura's regency number 094/Panwas.Kab.JYP/II/2017

Note 26. KPU Jayapura's Decision Number 324/KPU/VI/2016

Note 27. The Decision of DKPP's Number 46/DKPP-PKE-VI/2017 dan Nomor 88/DKPP-PKE-VI/2017

Note 28. KPU's letter number 75/KPU/02/03069733/2017

Note 29. Interview with Robert Sugedy, 12 November 2018

Note 30. Letter of District Head Association Kabupaten Jayapura Number 06/AKD-III/2017

Note 31. Court Decision IA Jayapura Nomor 146/Pid.Sus/2017/PN.Jap

Note 32. *Ibid*

Note 33. Bawaslu's Report R.I. Number 19/LP/PGBW/VII/2017

Note 34. Bawaslu's Recommendation Number 0604/K.Bawaslu/PM.06.00/VIII/2017

Note 35. KPU's Decision Number 71/Kpts/KPU-Kab.Jpr/030.434090/2017

Note 36. Decision of Constitutional Court Number 59/PHP.Bup-XV/2017

Note 37. Interview with the Chairman of KPU of Papua Province, Adam Arisoi, 15 November 2018

Note 38. DKPP's Decision Number 46/DKPP-PKE-VI/2017 and Number 88/DKPP-PKE-VI/2017

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